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SIPDIS

SENSITIVE, SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF/SE NATSIOS, AF/AS FRAZER
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [SOCI](#) [AU](#) [UN](#) [SU](#)

SUBJECT: HEAVY SUPPORT PACKAGE UPDATE

SUMMARY

¶1. (SBU) Summary. In an October 4 report, the Chief of Plans for UNAMID Transition, Colonel Johnstone, in El Fasher, North Darfur, described current UNAMID deployment status. He termed GOS cooperation to date as "reasonable," noted the complexity of the transition, provided a rundown of troop contributions to date, and cited the lack of helicopters as negatively affecting their capabilities. End Summary.

GOS COOPERATION: REASONABLE

¶2. (SBU) He described GoS efforts to facilitate deployment of the Heavy Support Package (HSP) as 'overall reasonable.' He said there were a few problems with local authorities, but felt these problems stemmed from issues over payment and proper paperwork, not from any GoS policy of obstruction. Other problems, he said, were due to the sheer complexity and magnitude of the deployment operation.

AN EXTREMELY LARGE, COMPLEX UNDERTAKING

¶3. (SBU) Observers and many UNAMID officers believe that the AMIS-UNAMID transition is the most complex operation in UN history. No matter how cooperative and supportive the GoS chooses to be, the enlargement of a 7,000 person AMIS force into a hybrid force of over 23,000 soldiers plus thousands of civpols and civilians, in a large, remote area with little water and natural resources faces a number of logistical and organizational challenges. Darfur is already straining to support the indigenous population, and is still undergoing desertification.

¶4. (SBU) Water will be a limiting factor, and UNAMID is in the process of obtaining permission to use the required tracts of land. While African nations have pledged significant numbers of infantry units to maintain UNAMID's 'African character,' the UN is focused on recruiting larger units (800 instead of 680 man battalions), and, perhaps more importantly, ensuring that they are adequately equipped. The HSP still has insufficient pledges for medium transport helicopters, tactical helicopters, and heavy ground transportation assets. Finally, the UN has not yet signed contracts for the support and maintenance at its camps.

ISSUES WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS

¶5. (SBU) At the same time, there are small but important issues related to deployment of UNAMID troops that need to be resolved. Local officials at Port Sudan's Port Authority have raised concerns with the Ministry of Interior and other ministries over who will pay for the port service fees associated with use of the port. Local

officials in El Fasher have demanded to know the UN's authority to operate communications equipment in Sudan. Johnstone dismissed this issue as already being covered in their Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). He further stated that this issue requires time and effort to reach a mutually satisfactory understanding with local officials.

HEAVY SUPPORT PACKAGE UPDATE

¶6. (SBU) In an October 4 AMIS report, AMIS described the Heavy Support Package (HSP) selected, and accepted Troop Contributing Countries (TCC):

Military Assets	Strength	Accepted TCC
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SECTOR: NORTH/NORTH DARFUR

Multi-Role Engineer	275	Pakistan
Signal Company	150	Egypt

SECTOR: SOUTH/SOUTH DARFUR

Multi-Role Engineer	275	China
Heavy Transport	200	Egypt
Multi-Role Logistics	300	Bangladesh
Utility Helicopter (SIX Helicopters)	160	NONE
Air Recon (THREE Aircraft)	50	Pakistan
Light Tactical Helicopter	200	NONE

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(SIX Helicopters)		
Level III Hospital	120	Pakistan

SECTOR: WEST/WEST DARFUR

Multi-Role Engineer	275	Egypt
Level II Hospital	60	Nigeria

TOTAL 2065

TOTAL WITH FORCE PROTECTION 2250

¶7. (SBU) The AU-UN agreed Troop Contributing Countries, pending Pre-Deployment Visits are:

- Burkina Faso - Infantry Battalion
- Egypt - Infantry Battalion
- Ethiopia - Infantry Battalion
 - Multi-Role Logistics Company
 - Recon Company
 - Medium Heavy Transport Company
- Gambia - Force HQ Company
 - Recon Company
- Ghana - Infantry Battalion
- Kenya - Military Police Company
- Malawi - Infantry Battalion
- Mali - Infantry Battalion
- Nigeria - Recon Company
 - Sector Reserve Company
- Senegal - Infantry Battalion
- Bangladesh - Sector Reserve Company
- Jordan - Multi-Role Logistics Company
- Nepal - Force Reserve/Special Forces Co.
 - Sector Reserve Company
- Netherlands - Level II Hospital
- Nordics - Multi-Role Engineer Company
- Thailand - Infantry Battalion

Note: While the report lists Nordic and Thailand troops as

"accepted," we understand that the GoS has not accepted these troops. End Note.

¶8. (SBU) The report identified several shortfalls in critical areas: three Medium Utility Wings, two Medium Heavy Transportation Companies, and a Light Tactical Helicopter Wing. UNAMID said the shortfalls will have a negative impact on operational and logistical capabilities.

COMMENT

¶9. (SBU) The UN faces enormous challenges in Darfur, but, so far, the obstacles to deployment of the AU-UN Hybrid force are more logistical and organizational than political. According to UN commanders, GoS has been reasonable in facilitating this operation.

POWERS